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Epistemologists have recently noted a tension between (i) denying access
internalism and (ii) maintaining that rational agents cannot be epistemi-
cally akratic, believing claims akin to ‘P, but I shouldn’t believe P’. I bring
out the tension, and develop a new way to resolve it. The basic strategy
is to say that access internalism is false, but that counterexamples to it
are ‘elusive’ in a way that prevents rational agents from suspecting that
they themselves are counterexamples to the internalist principles. I argue
that this allows us to do justice to the motivations behind both (i) and (ii).
And I explain in some detail what a view of evidence that implements this
strategy, and makes it independently plausible, might look like.
Access internalism says that we can always tell, simply by reflecting, whether
our beliefs are rational or justified. Evidentialism maintains that our beliefs are
rational or justified insofar as they conform to our evidence. Together, the two
views require that we can always tell by reflection what evidence we have.
Externalists object that this ‘access’ requirement on evidence is unsustain-
able: nothing, or at any rate not nearly enough, could count as evidence if we
always have to be able to tell what our evidence is. In particular, for reasons I
summarize in §1, all externalists should agree that we must reject the ‘negative
access’ requirement:
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Negative Access
If P is not part of one’s evidence, one has conclusive evidence that P
is not part of one’s evidence.
But there are also strong reasons to accept access internalism. Some of these,
such as the thought that only access internalism can provide epistemic norms
able to ‘guide’ agents when forming beliefs, are too familiar to provide new lever-
age. Others, however, are more surprising. For example, the recent literature
on ‘level-connections’ in epistemology has brought out that counterexamples
to the access constraint on evidence make for cases in which agents have evi-
dence supporting ‘epistemically akratic’ conclusions akin to P, BUT I SHOULDN’T
BELIEVE P.1 Believing such conclusions, however, looks irrational.
In response to this worry, some externalists argue that akratic beliefs can be
rational after all;2 others conclude that rationality and one’s evidence sometimes
make incompatible demands, thus rejecting evidentialism.3 On the face of it,
neither option is attractive.
But there is another way. We can reject negative access, accept evidentialism,
and nonetheless avoid epistemic akrasia. To do so, we need to challenge the
move from someone having evidence for a proposition to that person being able
to believe that proposition in line with her evidence – a move which, I argue, is
independently problematic. The move can be blocked in sufficient generality
by appeal to a form of contextualism (or relativism, or expressivism) about
what counts as part of someone’s evidence.4 On the resulting picture, negative
access failures are real but elusive: rational agents can never suspect that they
are happening to them. This allows us to subscribe to what is attractive in
externalism, without accepting its worst excesses.
1The thought that an anti-akrasia constraint might require access internalism is explicit
in Bergmann (2005), Gibbons (2006), Smithies (2012), White (2014), Lasonen-Aarnio (2015),
Worsnip (forthcoming), and Dorst (ms).
2This is the response suggested by Lasonen-Aarnio (2014, 2015); it seems to be implicitly
endorsed by Williamson (2011), and is explicitly left open by Horowitz (2014). Coates (2012) and
Weatherson (ms) argue for this conclusion on slightly different grounds.
3Christensen (2007, 2010) floats such a response. Worsnip (forthcoming) advocates it explicitly,
though he allows that there are some normative notions of which evidentialism is true.
4The appeal to contextualism makes my view a version of what Greco (2017) calls ‘Contextualist
Foundationalism’; Greco defends the general viability of this approach, and argues that it can
also help with issues related to defeat.
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1 Against Negative Access
Externalists reject the negative access principle, worrying that it implies that
nothing, or at any rate not nearly enough, counts as evidence. While I think it
compelling, I won’t defend it in detail here. I will, however, recapitulate it briefly,
to ensure that the later discussion remains sensitive to its spirit as well as its
letter.
The worry can be put as follows.5 All, or almost all, our information-gathering
mechanisms are fallible: they sometimes malfunction and provide us with a
falsehood, without giving us any warning that this has happened. In such a case,
the deliverance of the mechanism, being false, cannot be part of our evidence.
On pain of ruling out too many of our information-gathering mechanisms, this
had better not imply that the deliverances of those mechanisms aren’t part of
our evidence when things are going well (even if we didn’t know beforehand
that they would). But then we get failures of negative access. For consider a
case where someone is provided with P by a mechanism that is, on this occasion,
malfunctioning. Since P is false, it isn’t part of her evidence. But, since she has
no reason to think that anything is awry, she has no reason to think that P is not
part of her evidence. So, while P isn’t part of her evidence, she has no evidence
that this is so: she is a counterexample to negative access.
A paradigm instance of this problem is perception. Sometimes, my visual
system tells me that a wall is red even though it’s not, e.g. because it’s a white
wall misleadingly lit to look red. Let’s call this the bad case, in contrast with
the good case in which I see that the wall is red. In the bad case, it isn’t part of
my evidence that the wall is red. But, the externalist maintains, we shouldn’t
conclude that this claim is never part of my evidence, or is part of my evidence
only if I knew beforehand that conditions are good. In particular, we shouldn’t
conclude that this claim is not part of my evidence in the good case. Instead,
we should accept that, in the bad case, we have a violation of negative access:
THE WALL IS RED isn’t part of my evidence; but, since it is part of my evidence in
the good case, and I have no reason to think I’m not in the good case, I have no
5Something like this argument is implicit in McDowell (1982, 1995, 2011) and Williamson (2000,
ch.8). My presentation follows Weatherson (2011, p.451).
3
reason to think that THE WALL IS RED isn’t part of my evidence.
While one can, of course, be an externalist and reject this particular example,
I will use it as my paradigm case of a negative access failure in what follows.
2 From Externalism to Akrasia
We should reject the negative access principle. However, as indicated in the
introduction, there is a powerful argument that doing so commits us to the
rationality of intuitively problematic attitudes that are naturally described as
‘epistemically akratic’. This section will lay out the problem; the rest of the paper
will attempt to solve it.
The most straightforward case of an (epistemically) akratic agent is someone
who believes a statement of the form ‘P, but I shouldn’t believe P’ or ‘P, but my
evidence doesn’t support P.’ More generally, an agent is akratic if her attitudes
conflict with her thoughts about what attitudes she should have.
What does this come to when we move to a graded framework which rec-
ognizes multiple levels of confidence or credences?6 It’s clearly akratic to have
one credence, while believing a different one to be rational: ‘I’m .3 confident in
P, though my evidence supports P to degree .5’ definitely sounds off. But there
may be no particular credence which the agent thinks is rational; what is it to
be akratic then? A natural proposal is that akrasia arises when one’s credence
diverges from one’s best estimate of what the evidence supports: ‘I’m .3 confi-
dent in P, though I estimate that my evidence supports P to degree .5’ still seems
like an odd thing to say. Probabilistic frameworks nicely capture estimates of
a quantity as the expected value of that quantity: the weighted average of the
possible values, weighted by how likely the quantity is to have that value. In our
case, this means that an agent is akratic if her credence differs from the expected
evidential support, as calculated using her credences.7
6I take a stance on this primarily to make the discussion more concrete. For I show in Ap-
pendix A that, once we reject negative access for the reason discussed in §1, it is hard to see what
would prevent the possibility of bodies of evidence that support credence distributions that are
clearly akratic on any plausible account.
7See Christensen (2010) and Horowitz and Sliwa (2015) for further discussion.
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Epistemic akrasia looks like a paradigm instance of irrationality.8 But, oddly
enough, agents who violate negative access have evidence that supports an
akratic state. For someone who violates negative access has evidence that differs
from what she has reason to think it is. So her evidence supports one thing
(supports P to one degree) and what she has reason to think her evidence is
supports another (supports P to a different degree). Since the evidential support
for her first-order beliefs depends on her evidence, and the evidential support
for propositions about what’s rational depends on what her evidence says her
evidence is, the two will come apart. So her evidence supports an akratic state.9
This problem arises quite clearly in the case of the red wall.10 Suppose that
your background evidence establishes conclusively that you are either faced
with a red wall or else with a white wall with red light shining on it. As it turns
out, you are in the bad case, facing the white wall. So your evidence is just that
the wall appears red, which (let us assume) supports the claim that it is red to
degree .9. But you also know the relevant epistemological facts: in particular,
you know that if the wall is red, the fact that it’s red is part of your evidence and
so your evidence supports the claim that it’s red to degree 1. So your evidence
supports to degree .1 that your evidence supports the claim that the wall is red
to degree .9, and supports to degree .9 that it supports the claim to degree 1. So
your evidence supports estimating the evidential support for the wall being red
8Cf Adler (2002), Feldman (2005), Kolodny (2005), Gibbons (2006), Christensen (2007, 2010),
Smithies (2012), Elga (2007, 2013), Greco (2014a), Horowitz (2014), Titelbaum (2015), and
Worsnip (forthcoming). For dissent, see Williamson (2011), Coates (2012), Lasonen-Aarnio
(2014, 2015), and Weatherson (ms).
9This intuitive argument doesn’t quite show that all agents who are counterexamples to negative
access will have akrasia-supporting evidence. For, as formulated, it suffers from presupposition
failure: there may be no body which our agent has reason to think is her total evidence. This
matters because the uncertainty in what our agent’s evidence is could ‘cancel out’ so that
evidential support and expected evidential support coincide. For example, our agent’s evidence
could be E1, which supports p to degree
1
2 ; and E1 could assign
1
3 probability each to her total
evidence being E1, E2, and E3, where E2 conclusively refutes p and E3 conclusively establishes
p. Then E1 would violate the access principle, but it would not licence akrasia. Nonetheless, the
intuitive argument makes clear why it would be an incredible coincidence if the negative access
principle were false and yet no agent’s evidence ever supported an akratic state; this makes (P2)
highly plausible, even if not undeniable. Moreover, Williamson (2011), Samet (forthcoming),
and Dorst (ms) prove that, in fact, such a coincidence can’t obtain systematically, so that if any
agents violate negative access, then some agents have akrasia-supporting evidence.
10Cf White (2014, p.306-8).
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at .1× .9+ .9×1= .99, while also being only .9 confident of the wall being red.11
It thus looks as though, if you follow your evidence, you will be akratic.
We now have all the pieces for a powerful argument from externalism to the
rationality of akrasia:
(P1) The negative access principle is false.
(P2) If the negative access principle is false, someone could have akratic
evidence (that is: evidence supporting an akratic state).
(P3) If someone could have akratic evidence, someone could rationally
be akratic.
(C) Someone could rationally be akratic.
We have already motivated (P1) and (P2). (P3) looks like a modest consequence of
evidentialism, stating that conforming one’s beliefs to one’s evidence is sufficient
for being rational. And the argument is clearly valid. We thus seem forced into
the unattractive conclusion that having akratic beliefs can be rational.
Before responding to the argument, I should explain how it connects to the
literature. The general tension brought out by the argument, between external-
ism and anti-akrasia, is quite familiar. The focus, however, is unusual. Most of
the literature ignores examples like that of the wall, which are motivated by the
argument against negative access from §1; instead it focuses on (alleged) coun-
terexamples to positive access (the principle that if P is part of one’s evidence,
one has conclusive evidence that P is part of one’s evidence), often supported
by considerations about margins for error, or on (alleged) examples of agents
with misleading evidence about what supports what.12 This is understandable,
11A divergence of .09 may strike some as too small to worry about. However, I doubt that we can
rule out arbitrarily large divergences in a principled manner once we deny the negative access
principle. See Appendix A for discussion.
Note that nothing depends on the evidence, when the wall is white, supporting its being red to
degree .9; it’s sufficient that it neither rules out that the wall is red nor supports it conclusively.
For suppose the evidence supports it to degree x. Then, when the wall is white, the evidence
estimates the support at (1−x)×x+x×1= 2x−x2, which equals x only if x = 0 or x = 1.
12For example, Christensen (2010), Williamson (2011), and Elga (2013) all focus on a case moti-
vated by margins for error, while Christensen (2007), Elga (2007), Coates (2012), and Weatherson
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since those examples are more immediately intuitive than the theory-laden case
of the wall. Nonetheless, it is a mistake. For these examples are supported by
arguments far less compelling than that of §1. In particular, there may well
be viable externalist positions which embrace positive access or the view that
rational agents cannot be misled about the evidential support relation;13 but
there is no way externalists can subscribe to negative access. As externalists,
then, the version of the problem discussed here should be our primary concern.
My defence of the focus on negative access has an ulterior motive. For, while
the gap I diagnose in the argument above is present in similar arguments based
on failures of positive access or misleading evidence about evidential support, I
see no obvious way of extending my strategy for systematically exploiting that
gap to these other cases. But since mine is the hardest case, and since we might,
even as externalists, have other resources for handling the other cases, this does
not eliminate the interest of my approach.
3 TheWay Out
The argument from externalism to akrasia is powerful; but, fortunately, (P3) is
not as innocent as it appears. This premise lets us move from the observation
that some agents have evidence which supports an akratic state to the claim
that some agents are rationally akratic. But this transition is non-trivial: having
evidence which supports a state does not always mean that one can rationally
be in that state, even if we accept the evidentialist thesis that rationality is a
matter of conforming ones beliefs to the evidence. I will illustrate this using a
more familiar case, before explaining how it might apply to akratic states.
Consider the Moorean conjunction Q AND I DON’T BELIEVE THAT Q. It is
often noted that a claim of this form can be true. More important for us is that it
(ms) focus on cases where agents have misleading evidence about the evidential support rela-
tion. Horowitz (2014) and Worsnip (forthcoming) discuss both types of cases, but don’t discuss
examples motivated along the lines of §1.
13McHugh (2010), Greco (2014b), Stalnaker (2015), and Das and Salow (forthcoming) suggest
ways to reconcile externalism with positive access. Greco (2014a), Titelbaum (2015), and Smithies
(2015) develop strategies for denying the possibility of misleading evidence about relations of
evidential support, which look independent of the internalism/externalism debate.
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can also be supported by one’s evidence. In fact, anyone who (like most of us)
has strong evidence for some Q, while obviously failing to believe it, has strong
evidence for a Moorean conjunction. Clearly it would be a mistake to conclude,
just from this, that someone could rationally believe such a conjunction.
In the Moorean case, it’s easy to see why this doesn’t follow, even given
evidentialism. For it’s plausible that (i) one has evidence supporting a Moorean
conjunction only when one doesn’t currently conform to one’s evidence. After
all, it’s plausible that agents can tell what they believe; it follows that one has
strong evidence for Q AND I DON’T BELIEVE THAT Q only when one doesn’t believe
Q. Moreover, one has strong evidence for Q AND I DON’T BELIEVE THAT Q only
when one has strong evidence for Q. Putting the two together, we get that one
has strong evidence for Q AND I DON’T BELIEVE THAT Q only when one doesn’t
believe Q despite having strong evidence for it. That is, one has strong evidence
for the Moorean conjunction only when one fails to conform some relevant
beliefs to one’s evidence.14
It follows from (i) that (ii) in conforming to some evidence that supports a
Moorean conjunction, one changes matters so that one’s evidence no longer
supports that conjunction. But it’s worth looking a bit more carefully at why
conforming to the Moore-paradoxical evidence is self-undermining in this way.
To conform to evidence supporting Q AND I DON’T BELIEVE THAT Q, one has to,
among other things, come to believe Q. But coming to believe Q changes what
evidence one has; and, for the Moorean proposition, some of these changes
matter. For one’s new evidence no longer supports the claim that one doesn’t
believe Q, and thus no longer supports the conjunction Q AND I DON’T BELIEVE
THAT Q. While one starts off with evidence for the Moorean conjunction, at-
tempting to conform to it changes what evidence one has in such a way that the
new evidence no longer supports that conjunction.
The Moorean case thus reveals a gap between (a) having evidence that sup-
ports a state and (b) being able to be in that state while conforming to one’s
evidence; it thus shows that (P3) doesn’t immediately follow from evidentialism.
14This treatment of the Moorean case, especially in its assumption that agents can always
tell what they believe, is controversial. However, I’m using this case primarily to illustrate the
non-triviality of (P3); it can serve that purpose even if my treatment of it is, ultimately, mistaken.
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To reject (P3), however, we need more: we need to argue that akratic evidence
systematically falls into that gap, just like Moorean evidence does. We thus have
to motivate analogues of the above claims about Moorean evidence: (i’) one has
akratic evidence only because one doesn’t currently conform to one’s evidence;
and therefore, (ii’) in conforming to one’s current evidence, one would change
things so that one’s new evidence no longer supports an akratic state. Since the
akratic evidence under discussion here is evidence violating the negative access
principle, it would be sufficient to motivate:
Instability
An agent violates the negative access principle only if (and while)
her beliefs don’t perfectly conform to her evidence.
By endorsing Instability, we can reject (P3) without rejecting evidentialism. On
the resulting view, agents who perfectly conform to their evidence will never
have evidence that violates negative access, and hence won’t be akratic – or, at
least, won’t be akratic because of issues arising from negative access.15
4 Contextualizing the RedWall
I have explained the tension between externalism and the claim that akrasia
is irrational, and described a strategy for resolving it. The question now is
whether this strategy can be successfully implemented, by explaining why akratic
evidence would be unstable in the required way.
Moorean conjunctions illustrate one source of instability. Could the instabil-
ity in akratic conjunctions be exactly analogous? It seems not. Moorean evidence
is unstable because whether I have evidence for the second conjunct – that I
15Smithies (2012, p.288-292) discusses the related gap between having justification for a proposi-
tion and having a justified belief in that proposition; he even includes the analogy with Moorean
propositions (crediting it to Ralph Wedgwood). However, the only proposal he discusses for
exploiting this gap is Bergman’s (2005) view that believing that one shouldn’t believe P defeats
one’s justification for believing P. Since Bergman gives no explanation for why believing that one
shouldn’t believe P would change one’s evidence about P, that defeat is naturally understood to
only affect one’s doxastic justification for believing P; this leaves the view open to Smithies’ (2012,
p.288-292) objection that it is insufficiently explanatory. By following the Moorean analogy more
fully, and defending Instability, we can improve on Bergman’s view in exactly this respect.
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believe Q – depends on whether I believe the first conjunct – namely Q. Things
seem different for akratic conjunctions: whether I have evidence for the second
conjunct – that I shouldn’t believe P – does not seem to depend on whether I
believe the first conjunct P (or vice versa). If akratic evidence is unstable, this
won’t be because what I believe affects my evidence. But it could be for a similar
reason identified by contextualists: what I believe might affect my epistemic
standards, and hence what the word ‘evidence’ applies to when I use it.
How would this help? Let us say that an agent takes a possibility seriously if
that possibility is compatible with her (all-out) beliefs. And suppose that whether
I take seriously the possibility of funny lighting affects what ‘evidence’ refers
to when I utter it as follows. When I don’t take the error possibility seriously, I
use ‘evidence’ to refer to evidencelo . And evidencelo works exactly as we have
been assuming, in that THE WALL IS RED can become part of one’s evidencel o
when one looks at the wall, provided only that looking is in fact reliable in one’s
circumstances. By contrast, when I do take the error possibility seriously, my
usage picks out the more stringent evidencehi ; and claims like THE WALL IS RED
can become part of one’s evidencehi only if one has already checked that the
lighting is normal. This, I claim, allows us to implement the Instability-based
solution in the example of the red wall.16
(I have, and will continue to, put the point in contextualist terms. But one can
say exactly parallel things if one adopts an analogous relativism or expressivism
about ‘evidence’.17 I believe that invariantist views, even if ‘subject-sensitive’,
cannot implement an equally attractive version of the strategy;18 but I won’t
16See e.g. Hawthorne (2004, p.73-77) and Neta (2005). Obviously it’s implausible that there is
a single relation, evidencelo (evidencehi ), which we always pick out when we don’t (do) take
seriously that the lighting is misleading. On any plausible version of contextualism, there will
be myriad relations that the phrase ‘p is part of X’s evidence’ can pick out, and our attitude
towards this particular error possibility is only one constraint in settling which one we do pick
out. But we can categorize these relations according to whether one can come to bear them to
the proposition THE WALL IS RED just by looking at the wall, without having checked the lighting.
The claim I actually require is then that, at least sometimes, when we don’t take the possibility of
misleading lighting seriously, we use ‘evidence’ to pick out a relation that has this property; and
that, when we do take the possibility seriously, we always use ‘evidence’ to pick out a relation
that lacks this property. And that claim is quite plausible. But, for presentational simplicity, I
will continue with the simplifying assumption made in the main text.
17For epistemic relativism, see MacFarlane (2005); for expressivism, see Chrisman (2007).
18For subject sensitive invariantism as an alternative to contextualism, see e.g. Fantl and
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argue that here.)
On the contextualist account, the case of the red wall divides into two, de-
pending on whether the subject takes the error possibility seriously. Suppose
first that she does. Then, as she uses it, ‘my evidence’ will pick out her evidencehi .
But checking the lighting is required before THE WALL IS RED can be part of her
evidencehi , regardless of how cooperative the circumstances are. And our agent
can tell that she has performed no such checks. So she can tell that THE WALL
IS RED isn’t part of what she refers to with ‘my evidence’, regardless of what the
actual circumstances are. She thus won’t be worried that she should be more
confident that the wall is red; and so she won’t be akratic.
Suppose instead that she doesn’t take the possibility of misleading lighting
seriously and all-out believes that the wall is red. Then, as she uses it, ‘my
evidence’ will refer to her evidencel o , and whether THE WALL IS RED is part of
her evidencelo does depend on what the circumstances are actually like. But
she can’t be worried about this dependence. By hypothesis, she all-out believes
that the lighting is good; so, provided she draws the obvious consequence, she
also believes that THE WALL IS RED is part of her evidencelo , and hence that her
all-out belief that it’s red is fully justified.19
Importantly, treating the case this way does not eliminate the counterexam-
ple to negative access. If our subject fails to take the possibility of misleading
lighting seriously when it is actual, she is a counterexample to negative access
for evidencelo – the thing she refers to with ‘evidence’. Since the wall isn’t red,
her evidencelo won’t include THE WALL IS RED. But her evidencel o won’t tell her
that it doesn’t include that claim, since it leaves open the possibility that the
wall might be red and the lighting normal, in which case THE WALL IS RED would
have been part of her evidencel o . So she is a counterexample to negative access,
and the information she refers to with ‘my evidence’ supports an akratic state.
McGrath (2002), Hawthorne (2004), and Stanley (2005).
19What if she does not draw the consequence? Then she could indeed be akratic, all-out
believing that the wall is red while estimating that she should only be .99. But she will not be
rational: either her first-order belief (if she is, in fact, in the bad case) or her higher-order belief
(if she is, in fact, in the good case) will fail to conform to what she refers to with ‘evidence’. (She
will also be structurally irrational, incoherently taking the wall to be red when wondering what
colour it is but not when wondering what her evidence says about its colour. As discussed in
footnote 30, this is no accident.)
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It’s just that she doesn’t suspect that this is going on, and hence won’t herself
be akratic. Moreover, if she were to suspect that this is going on, her usage of
‘evidence’ would change to pick out evidencehi instead; and the case of the red
wall is no counterexample to negative access for evidencehi .
20
This treatment of the red wall implements the Instability strategy. The in-
formation our subject refers to with ‘my evidence’ violates negative access, and
hence supports an akratic state, only when she fails at perfectly conforming her
beliefs to it. For we get no negative access violation (for what the subject picks
out with ‘evidence’) when the subject is merely .9 confident that it is red: in that
case, she uses ‘evidence’ to pick out evidencehi and she can tell that THE WALL IS
RED is not part of her evidencehi . And we also get no violation when the subject
believes the wall to be red and it really is: in that case, she uses ‘evidence’ to pick
out evidencelo , and THE WALL IS RED is part of her evidencelo . It is only if the
subject believes the wall to be red when it isn’t that we get a violation. But in that
case, her doxastic state doesn’t perfectly conform to what she refers to as ‘my
evidence’, since that calls for high confidence, rather than all-out belief, in the
claim that the wall is red.
Moreover, this fact explains why our subject’s attempts to conform to her
20But isn’t it still true – as a referee suggested – that our agent can figure out that THAT WALL IS
RED is not part of her evidence simply through reflection? After all, the process of taking new
possibilities seriously looks rather like reflection, and the result of that process is that the agent
knows that she lacks this piece of evidence. And if that’s right, it looks like our account vindicates
the core commitment of internalism.
However, I think this notion of ‘being able to know by reflection what evidence one has’ is too
deflated to provide comfort. For note that reflection, even if extended to include the process of
taking seriously new possibilities, cannot tell our subject whether THAT WALL IS RED is part of
her evidencel o . It thus isn’t a way of answering the question she originally asked herself. At best,
it’s a way for her to shift her interest to the question of whether THAT WALL IS RED is part of her
evidencehi – a question she finds much easier to answer. But that’s cheating: we can answer any
question by reflection if we’re allowed to replace it with an easier one.
Suppose, however, that we waive this first point, granting that there is a good sense in which
the questions are the same. Then a different worry arises, namely that this reflection succeeds
only because it can ‘change’ what the answer is, making our subject ‘throw out’ evidence by
raising her standards so that previously eligible propositions no longer qualify. This means that
reflection puts us ‘in a position to know’ the answer to our question only in a highly attenuated
sense. Suppose you buy an App which is advertised as ‘putting you in a position to know’ how
much money you have in your account. But when you open the App, it turns out to consist
entirely of a single button which will, when pressed, donate the entire contents of your account
(if any) to charity. You would feel cheated. Since the reflective process which ‘puts you in a
position to know’ what your evidence is is no better, we should reject the internalist marketing.
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evidence, in the case where it does support an akratic conjunction, would be
self-undermining, much like in our Moorean example. Suppose that our subject
starts off in the worst case: she’s faced with a white wall, but doesn’t take that
possibility seriously. Then the information she refers to with ‘my evidence’
(i.e. her evidencel o) supports the claim she would express with the akratic
conjunction ‘the wall is .9 likely to be red, but I estimate that my evidence
supports it being red to degree .99.’ But it does so only because the information
she refers to with ‘my evidence’ does not in fact rule out that the wall is white.
So in order to conform to the body she calls ‘my evidence’, she would have to
start taking seriously the possibility that the wall is white.
Let’s suppose that, a little later, she does just that. She can then come to
believe the claim that she would previously have expressed with the akratic
conjunction, namely that the wall is .9 likely to be red, but that she estimates
that her evidencel o supports it being red to degree .99. But this claim no longer
has the form of an akratic conjunction for her, because when she now uses
‘evidence’, she refers not to evidencel o but to evidencehi . That is, the norm she
now feels bound by is one that tells her to conform her beliefs to her evidencehi .
So believing or asserting that the wall is .9 likely to be red, but that she estimates
that her evidencel o supports it being red to degree .99, is no more akratic than
doing φwhilst believing or asserting that, according to rule R which one doesn’t
endorse, one shouldn’t φ. To be akratic now, our agent would have to believe
that the wall is .9 likely to be red, while estimating that her evidencehi supports
it being red to degree .99. But that isn’t something she’s inclined to do, since she
knows full well that her evidencehi supports the wall being red to degree .9.
This explanation may make it seem as if this solution is a case of linguistic
trickery: we only predict that agents will never sincerely utter akratic conjunc-
tions. But that isn’t right. The important point is that what propositions we aim
to conform our beliefs to (call them ‘the propositions that are special by our
standards’) depends on what possibilities we take seriously. Genuine akrasia
would be a state in which we have one attitude, whilst also thinking that the
propositions that are special by our standards support a different conclusion.
Our account explains why a rational agent will never be in such a state, even
though her evidence may support a proposition R, such that believing R whilst
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having her current standards would be such a state. For in following her evi-
dence, our agent would change her standards and hence which propositions
she treats as special; so if she then comes to believe R, doing so doesn’t put her
into a state where her attitudes and her views about what the propositions that
are special by her standards support come apart.
These points also help with a slightly different worry. Suppose that we are
in a context where we use ‘evidence’ to mean evidencel o . And suppose that we
are discussing someone who is faced with the white wall, and takes the error
possibility seriously. Then couldn’t we describe her by saying ‘she is .9 confident
of P, but estimates that her evidence supports P to degree .99’? After all, when we
use it, ‘evidence’ means evidencel o , and she does estimate that her evidencel o
supports P to degree .99.21 Moreover, since the subject is conforming her belief
to her evidencelo – the thing we describe as ‘her evidence’ – we can truly say that
the subject is rational. But then it seems like we can truly attribute an akratic
state to a subject we truly describe as rational.
The previous discussion shows that this worry is misguided: the state which
we are ascribing to the subject is not an akratic state. There is no tension in
thinking something, while also thinking that by some standards one rejects, one
shouldn’t think that – and, as we noted above, that is all that is involved in our
subject’s state. That there is no tension here is occluded by the words we’ve used
to describe the subject. But we should not be taken in by the form of words. In
the right sort of context, for example when ‘should’ expresses legal obligations,
I might describe someone as rationally φ-ing whilst knowing full well that she
shouldn’t φ. Despite what a superficial look at the form of words might suggest,
I have not thereby given an example of rational practical akrasia. The same,
I submit, is true when – in the scenario above – we describe our subject as
21Contextualists could resist this. For even if the reference of ‘evidence’ is normally determined
by what the speakers are taking seriously, this may not be true when the word occurs embedded
in a propositional attitude ascription, as it does here. Such behaviour would not be unusual:
perhaps ‘might’ normally means for-all-the-speakers-know, but ‘Sarah believes that it might be
raining’ almost always means that Sarah believes that it’s raining for-all-she-knows. Modelling
‘evidence’ on the behaviour of ‘might’ would suggest that ‘she is .9 confident of P but estimates
that her evidence supports P to degree .99’ is true, even in our mouth, only if she estimates that
her evidencehi supports P to degree .99 – which she does not. However, since there is a deeper
reason why this worry is misguided, I will grant this step for the sake of argument.
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believing one thing while estimating that her evidence supports another.
It’s worth noting that, despite the structural analogies, the way in which
attempting to conform to the problematic evidence is self-undermining is differ-
ent in the akratic case and in the Moorean one. In the Moorean case, conforming
one’s beliefs to one’s evidence changes what evidence one has; and the new
evidence no longer supports the problematic proposition. In the akratic case,
conforming one’s beliefs to one’s evidence changes what one means by ‘evidence’.
Interestingly enough, however, this leaves unaffected what evidence one could
correctly self-ascribe, since, in the bad case in which one has the potentially
akratic evidence, one’s evidencelo and one’s evidencehi are the same: both con-
tain weak propositions such as THE WALL APPEARS RED, and neither includes a
strong claim such as THE WALL IS RED. Instead, the change in what one means by
‘evidence’ changes which propositions count as akratic propositions to believe.
To this extent, the two resolutions work in slightly different ways.
We have now seen how certain contextualist judgements allow us to give
an Instability-based treatment of the red wall, a treatment that reconciles the
assumption that this is (on some uses of ‘evidence’) a counterexample to negative
access with the claim that it never rationalizes akrasia. The next, and final, step
is showing how this treatment of the particular example can be generalized and
integrated into a systematic contextualist theory.
5 A General Theory22
Can a plausible contextualist account predict Instability with complete general-
ity? I will argue that it can, by sketching a schematic and oversimplified theory
which does. But I do not claim that a theory like the one I sketch is the best or
only version of contextualism that can do this – if other versions have the same
feature, so much the better.
To simplify things, I will presuppose Williamson’s (2000, ch.9) controversial
view that one’s evidence consists of all and only the things one knows (E=K, for
short). This will make the task easier, since contextualism is more familiar and
22This section builds on Salow (2016), which focuses on the status of negative access specifically
in Lewis’s (1996) theory of knowledge.
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better developed for ‘knowledge’ than for ‘evidence’.23 It is also a convenient
way to make sure that the resulting theory fully respects the externalist objection
to negative access, since no plausible account of ‘knowledge’ could vindicate
the principle that whenever one doesn’t know P, one knows that one doesn’t
know P.24 However, the details of E=K won’t matter; we could do equally well,
for example, with a theory on which one’s evidence also includes claims one
is merely in a position to know (cf Williamson (2000, ch.9)) or is restricted to
claims known non-inferentially.
To build up our contextualist theory, start by considering a schematic relia-
bilist account of knowledge:
Reliabilism
X’s belief in P at w is knowledge iff X doesn’t falsely believe P in
possibilities that bear R to w .
This yields a more concrete view when we interpret R : for example as being close
to, being a relevant alternative to, or being at least as normal as.25
This schematic account is naturally adapted into one that relativizes knowl-
edge attributions to a set of possibilities S that play a similar role to the actual
world in fixing which possibilities matter, thus affecting how broad a range of
possibilities a belief has to be reliable in:26
23Though see Neta (2003) for contextualism directly about ‘evidence’, and for arguments that
this is preferrable to contextualism about ‘knowledge’.
24Some have claimed that Lewis’s (1996) contextualism entails this principle; Holliday (2015)
and Salow (2016) show that this is a mistake.
25‘Is close to’ makes this a safety-theoretic account of the kind inspired by Sosa (1999) and
Williamson (2000); ‘is a relevant alternative to’ makes it a relevant alternatives theory of the
kind advocated by Dretske (1970) and Goldman (1976); ‘is at least as normal as’ makes it a
normal conditions account of the kind later favoured by Dretske (1981) as well as by Stalnaker
(2006). Our intuitive grasp on these notions may not guarantee that they are different; but, when
they are theoretically embedded, differences emerge. (One important difference is that only
some of these relations are plausibly transitive. When R is transitive, the account validates the
KK principle; and, as discussed in §2, that principle may be required for a full vindication of
anti-akrasia.) A fourth option is to endorse this account in a non-reductivist spirit, refusing to
say anything non-circular about R; cf Williamson (2009).
26The contextualist account developed by Lewis (1996), and endorsed in adapted form by
Blome-Tillmann (2009, 2014) and Ichikawa (2011a,b), has something very close to this structure.
While the account sketched by DeRose (1995) could fit a similar formal mold, his theory of how
S is determined differs significantly from the account I will be assuming.
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Relativized Reliabilism
X’s belief in P at w is knowledge relative to S iff X doesn’t falsely
believe P in possibilities that bear R to either w or any world in S.
This amounts to a contextualist account if we assume that, when agents make
unrelativized knowledge attributions, S is supplied by the context of utterance.
To have a term for S, let us call it the set of possibilities salient to the speaker
(keeping in mind that this is a technical notion).27
To derive concrete predictions from the account, we need to say something
about what makes a possibility salient. A plausible starting point is:
Salience Constraint
If X takes w seriously, then w is salient for X.
This condition follows from Blome-Tillman’s (2009; 2014) account of salience as
compatibility with one’s presuppositions if we assume that, as seems plausible at
least in single-individual contexts, if one presupposes something, one believes
it. It correctly predicts that, when, for practical reasons or because of a felt need
for greater intellectual responsibility, we take more error possibilities seriously,
our standards for knowledge rise. And it also suggests a nice story about why
they would do so. It’s natural to think that we attribute knowledge that P to those
we are willing to rely on to speak and act correctly when things depend on P;
but we would not want to rely on someone concerning P if we took seriously
possibilities in which their beliefs about P aren’t hooked up with the facts.
While schematic, this account is constrained enough to support the judge-
ments used in §4. Every world bears R to itself; so if X believes the wall to be
red when it isn’t, she cannot be described as knowing that it’s red regardless of
which possibilities are taken seriously. Similarly, if X believes that the wall is red
based on looks, and the lighting is unreliable, she won’t know in any sense of
‘knows’; for there will be worlds bearing R to the actual world (ones in which
the lighting is the same, but the wall is white) in which she believes this falsely.
By contrast, if the wall is red, and is red in all worlds bearing R to the actual
27There are interesting questions about how S is determined if different possibilities are salient
to different participants in the conversation; see DeRose (2004) for discussion. I side-step these
complications by focusing on ‘conversations’ with only one participant.
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world, it starts to matter which worlds the speakers take seriously. If they take
seriously possibilities in which the wall is white but appears red because of
odd lighting, they could not correctly describe a belief that the wall is red as
‘knowledge’ if it was formed just by looking. If, on the other hand, they don’t take
such possibilities seriously, they could.
Our schematic theory thus vindicates the judgements used in §4 to give an
akrasia-free treatment of the case of the red wall. But, what is more, our account
generalizes our treatment of that case to every counterexample to negative
access, thus providing a completely general escape from the argument of §2.
For our account entails a ‘blindspot’ thesis stating that agents can never take
seriously the possibility that they are violating negative access:28
Blindspot Thesis
Suppose that X is fully coherent: her beliefs are consistent and closed,
and she knows under which circumstances a proposition P and a
person Y are related in the way that would make ‘P is part of Y’s
evidence’ true as X uses those words. Then X all-out believes that
she is not currently a counterexample to negative access.
And the Blindspot Thesis implies the Instability principle from §3. For, by the
Blindspot Thesis, any agent whose beliefs perfectly reflect her evidence will all-
out believe that she is not a counterexample to negative access. But an all-out
belief in P perfectly reflects one’s evidence only if one has conclusive evidence
for P. Since everything for which one has conclusive evidence is true, it follows
that our agent is not a counterexample to negative access. So Instability is true.
Before looking at why exactly our account implies the blindspot thesis, it’s
worth noting that this thesis is suprising. After all, some people are counterexam-
ples to negative access. Given that some people violate negative access, what’s
to stop us from suspecting that we might be among them? But the account
provides an answer. Suppose someone begins to suspect that she is currently a
28The ‘blindspot’ terminology is from Sorensen (1988). My usage is slightly idiosyncratic since
I classify something as ‘falling in a blindspot’ only if the agent has to believe it even when it’s
false; it’s more common to classify something as ‘falling in a blindspot’ as long as the agent can’t
believe that it is false even when it is, which is consistent with her not taking a stance either way.
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counterexample to the negative access principle. That is, she begins to take seri-
ously certain possibilities in which a particular information-delivery mechanism
of hers is unreliable. Then she will use ‘evidence’ to refer to a more demanding
notion, so that the outputs of this particular information-delivery mechanism
never fall in the extension of ‘evidence’ as she is now starting to use that word.
But then she can tell that this mechanism isn’t delivering anything falling under
her use of ‘evidence’, whether or not it is unreliable. So the possibility in which
this mechanism is unreliable will no longer be one in which she lacks something
she would call ‘evidence’ but can’t tell that she does.
This is exactly what we saw happening in the case of the red wall. Ordinarily,
agents do not take seriously the possibility that the lighting is currently mis-
leading. They thus do not take seriously the possibilities in which they would
be counterexamples to the negative access principle. But suppose someone
starts entertaining doubts. Then she will raise her standards for what falls under
‘evidence’ so that simply looking at the red wall is not enough to have THAT
WALL IS RED as part of one’s evidence – before that can become part of one’s
evidence, one first has to check that appearances are not misleading. But now
the possibility in which the lighting is misleading is no longer a counterexample
to negative access for the notion the agent picks out with ‘evidence’. For, whether
or not the lighting is misleading, the agent can tell that she hasn’t checked that it
is. And so she can tell that THAT WALL IS RED fails to be part of the information
she picks out with ‘my evidence’ regardless of how good the lighting is.
This informal explanation can be turned into a more rigorous argument. Let
S be the set of possibilities salient in X’s context, and let w be a world which X
takes seriously and in which X doesn’t knowS P; we will show that, at w , X knows
that she doesn’t knowS P. We can assume that, at w , X believes P (otherwise she
would surely know that she doesn’t knowS it).29 By Relativized Reliabilism, this
means that there is some v in which X believes P though P is false, such that
29One might worry that externalists can’t accept the principle that we can always tell when we
fail to believe something. I think that the strategies for reconciling externalism with positive
access mentioned earlier can also reconcile it with this introspection principle. But, at any rate,
whether X believes P is only relevant because we are working with E=K instead of the very similar
view that one’s evidence consists of what one is in a position to know; so the theory could easily
be modified to avoid relying on this introspection principle.
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either (i) vRw or (ii) for some x ∈ S, vRx. But if (i), then (ii), since, by the Salience
Constraint, w ∈ S. So there is some v in which X falsely believes P which bears R
to some world in S. But then it trivially follows from the account of knowS that
X doesn’t knowS P at any world. So if X is at all reflective at w , she will know at
w that she doesn’t knowS P. Since w was an arbitrary world consistent with X’s
all-out beliefs in which X doesn’t knowS P, it follows that X all-out believes that
if she doesn’t knowS P, she knows that she doesn’t knowS it. In other words, X
believes that she is not a counterexample to negative access.
The argument just given is somewhat abstract; but it’s just the obvious gen-
eralization of what happens in the case of the red wall. Suppose there is a
possibility in which, according to how X actually uses ‘know’, X doesn’t know
the wall’s colour and also doesn’t know of her ignorance. Why doesn’t she know
the wall’s colour? We can set aside the possibility that she doesn’t have a be-
lief about the wall’s colour; if that were the case, she’d know that she doesn’t
know. So it must be that her belief is insufficiently reliable: the wall is actually
a different colour, or the lighting is misleading, or she is hallucinating. But,
crucially, the source of the unreliability must not itself be salient if X is to be
unaware of her ignorance. Suppose, for example, that the belief is unreliable
because the lighting is misleading; if that possibility were salient, the standards
for falling in the extension of ‘knowledge’ would be high enough that anyone
whose belief isn’t reliable when the light is misleading is ignorant, and X can tell
that she doesn’t clear that bar. So the possibility in which X is a counterexample
to negative access must be one in which her belief is unreliable in some way
that isn’t currently salient. But, by our Salience Constraint, any way of X being
unreliable that is consistent with X’s actual beliefs will be salient in her context.
So the possibility in which X is a counterexample to negative access must be
inconsistent with X’s actual beliefs.
We thus have the outline of a theory, consisting of Relativized Reliabilism and
the Salience Constraint, which entails the Blindspot Thesis and Instability, and
can thus implement the strategy of §§3-4 with full generality.30 Unfortunately,
30In fact, the Blindspot Thesis has implications for epistemic akrasia that go beyond its ability to
implement the Instability strategy. Instability guarantees only that you won’t be akratic (due to
issues arising from negative access) when you perfectly conform your beliefs to the evidence. As I
show in Appendix B, the Blindspot Thesis allows us to go further and show also that you won’t be
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I cannot quite leave things there. Before resting my case, I will address two
objections, the first of which requires me to refine the theory just described.
5.1 Generalized Blindspots
The first objection observes that Relativized Reliabilism and the Salience Con-
straint together entail not just the Blindspot Thesis, but also a more general
principle. For note that, in our derivation of the Blindspot Thesis, it never played
a role that subject and attributor of the knowledge ascriptions were the same.
So the argument really established
Generalized Blindspot Thesis
Suppose X is fully coherent. Then X all-out believes that no one is
(or has ever been, or will ever be) a counterexample to the negative
access principle.
But that principle looks obviously false. Suppose that I’ve stolen my friend’s
lunch from the fridge, and that he has not yet gone to look for it. Then surely I
can, without incoherence, say that he doesn’t know that his lunch is in the fridge,
but also doesn’t know that he doesn’t know this.
I think that’s right: the Generalized Blindspot Thesis really is absurd.31 And
I think that it’s a problem even for the use I’m trying to make of the theory,
which doesn’t require it to be exactly right – the problem with the Generalized
Blindspot Thesis is simply too close to the desired application to be dismissed
as a problem with the details.
The problem is that the Salience Constraint is too strong.32 Consider again
the case of the stolen lunch. Since I know that my friend’s lunch has been stolen,
I take the lunch theft possibility seriously. The Salience Constraint then entails
akratic provided only that your credences obey the probability axioms. This is a welcome result:
it means that akratic states are classified not only as failing to conform to the evidence, but also
as exhibiting a failure of structural rationality, as intuitively they do. Cf Worsnip (forthcoming).
31Though see Salow (2016, §2.1) for some defensive considerations.
32However the problem is not that we, loosely following Blome-Tillmann (2009), connected
salience to belief, rather than to attention as Lewis (1996) does. For the analogous principle
connecting salience to attention entails that we can never attend to any counterexamples to the
negative access principle, which is just as implausible.
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that I use ‘know’ to pick out a very demanding relation: one that, no matter
his environment, my friend could have borne to the proposition that the lunch
is in the fridge only if he had checked that it wasn’t stolen.33 But that’s wrong.
Nothing prevents me from using ‘know’ in an undemanding way which, for
example, allows me to say that my friend would have known where his lunch
was, if only I hadn’t stolen it.
What, then, is the difference between the possibility that my friend’s lunch
has been stolen (which I can take seriously without raising my standards) and
the possibility that the light in this room is misleading (which, intuitively, I
cannot)? A natural thought is that the latter threatens not just to make someone
unreliable, but to make me unreliable. Picking up on this suggestion, we can
weaken the Salience Constraint to:
Weak Salience Constraint
If X takes w seriously, and w bears R to a possibility in which X
herself has a false belief, then w is salient for X.
This weaker principle retains much that was attractive about the original one.
In particular, it upholds the link between what standards I set for ‘knowledge’
and which of my own beliefs I’m willing to rely on. It is more parochial, since
it allows me to recognize error possibilities faced by others whilst nonetheless
adopting standards for my own beliefs which work well only if I myself am not
in a similar predicament. But, given the pervasiveness of error, and the need to
continue with life regardless, such parochialism may be exactly what’s required.
Relativized Reliabilism and the Weak Salience Constraint do not entail the
Generalized Blindspot Thesis. Consider, for example, the case of the stolen
lunch. I take the possibility that my friend’s lunch has been stolen very seriously.
That possibility is one in which my friend is unreliable; but it is not a possibility
in which I am unreliable. So the Weak Salience Constraint is consistent with
saying that the stolen lunch possibility is not salient for me. So I can continue
to pick out a relatively undemanding relation in my use of ‘know’. And since
my friend is obviously unaware that he fails to bear even this undemanding
33Note that my friend can tell that he doesn’t bear that relation to the proposition that his lunch
is in the fridge – so once we get to this point, the Generalized Blindspot Thesis really does follow.
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relation to the proposition that his lunch is in the fridge, nothing prevents me
from registering this.
However, Relativized Reliabilism and the Weak Salience Constraint still entail
the ordinary Blindspot Thesis. For to take seriously that she herself might be a
counterexample to negative access, X would have to take seriously a possibility in
which she herself is unreliable. And since X herself is unreliable in that possibility,
the Weak Salience Constraint would then kick in to force that possibility into
salience. But when the possibility is salient, the standards are raised so that
‘know’ picks out a more demanding relation. And X is easily able to tell that she
does not bear this more demanding relation to the proposition in question.
The availability of the Weak Salience Constraint thus shows that natural
contextualist theories can entail the Blindspot Thesis without entailing its gener-
alization. This is enough to make my point that a plausible version of contex-
tualism can vindicate the Blindspot Thesis. That said, I want to remain neutral
on whether the retreat to the Weak Salience Constraint is ultimately the right
response for contextualists whose theories entail the Generalized Blindspot The-
sis. The problem is a new one, and it may be too early to tell how best to modify
otherwise attractive theories to avoid it. My hope, supported by the naturalness
of the retreat to the Weak Salience Constraint, is that the right response will
preserve the Blindspot Thesis. That this thesis can do the work I have carved out
for it is, I believe, further abductive reason to think so.34
5.2 Blindspots and Prefaces
However, one might worry that even the weaker Blindspot Thesis is still implau-
sible. The thesis says that I always have to believe that I satisfy negative access,
even though negative access isn’t always true. This just sounds incredible. Now,
we saw a contextualist explanation for why the very real negative access failures
are ‘elusive’ in just this way. But still. I know that virtually no one else satisfies
the negative access principle, and remember many cases in the past where I
violated it myself. Since I know that I-right-now am not relevantly different, why
34Salow (2016, §2.2) and, implicitly, Schultheis (ms) explore other responses. I suspect that
these can also be used to vindicate the Blindspot Thesis; but I won’t defend that suspicion here.
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should I think that I now satisfy negative access?
This worry should remind us of the preface paradox. Since I believe each of
my beliefs, I believe of each of my beliefs that it is true. Yet I know perfectly well
that virtually no one else has only true beliefs, and remember many cases in the
past when even I myself did not. Since I know that I-right-now am not relevantly
different, why should I think that I now have only true beliefs?
This is not the place for an in-depth discussion of that paradox. But it’s worth
filling out the analogy, just to show that this problem with the Blindspot Thesis
really is a problem for (nearly) everyone.
In the case of the preface paradox, it is natural to distinguish between (a)
believing of each of one’s beliefs that it is true and (b) believing that all of one’s
beliefs are true. We can draw a similar distinction in the case of the blindspot
thesis, between (a’) believing with respect to each proposition that one satisfies
the instance of negative access that concerns that propositions and (b’) believing
that one satisfies every instance of the negative access principle. The contextual-
ist account only directly motivates the weaker (a’). Moreover, to show that an
agent won’t be akratic with respect to a particular proposition P, we only need
to assume that the agent believes that she satisfies negative access with respect
to each proposition that she takes to be relevant to P. So something close to (a’)
is enough to show that agents won’t be akratic with respect to any particular
proposition. The distinction between believing each instance and believing the
generalization thus seems to help in our case just as much as it does in the case
of the preface paradox.
That distinction, of course, is difficult to maintain in the presence of prin-
ciples like multi-premise closure. This matters for our purposes because the
notion of ‘belief’ I have been using is supposed to be a notion of all-out belief,
the kind of belief that perfectly conforms only to conclusive evidence, and that
corresponds to maximal credence. And these notions (conclusive evidence,
maximal credence) seem like they will have to obey multi-premise closure. It is
thus unclear that the distinction between (a’) and (b’) can really be sustained
in the kind of background theory I have been working with. But then the same
thing will be true about the distinction between (a) and (b), and so the blindspot
thesis will still present no new problem over and above the one presented by the
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preface paradox.
We can make the same point in a more concessive spirit. The preface paradox
is easily solved if one rejects the notion of all-out belief, or maintains that there
is hardly anything that it is ever rational to all-out believe. A theorist of this
kind might be puzzled by the blindspot thesis, and by the account I have been
offering. But a theorist of this kind is likely not to see the point of the current
project in the first place; after all, the primary motivation of externalism, as I
have presented it, is to maintain that we can receive conclusive evidence from
fallible mechanisms. Someone who maintains that we should never form all-out
beliefs will presumably also think that conclusive evidence is not something
that we have or need; they are thus likely to get off the boat from the very
start. But anyone who, like my externalist, thinks that we often have conclusive
evidence, should accept that we have many rational all-out beliefs; any such
person should thus think that the preface paradox is a difficult problem, and that
some of the less intuitive features of the blindspot thesis are simply an instance
of this difficulty.
6 Conclusion
We began with a challenge. Externalists want to allow that we can have plenty
of evidence, even if some of that is delivered by fallible mechanisms. To allow
that, externalists reject the negative access principle. But, when negative access
fails, agents have evidence that supports an akratic conclusion. Externalists
thus seem forced to choose between allowing for rational akrasia or rejecting
evidentialism, neither of which is an attractive option.
I offered a way out: we can argue that agents only ever have evidence that
supports an akratic conclusion when (and while) they don’t perfectly conform
to their evidence. The fact that some agents have akrasia-supporting evidence
then doesn’t show that akrasia can be rational any more than the fact that some
agents have evidence for a Moorean conjunction establishes that believing such
conjunctions can be rational.
To implement this strategy with the desired generality, I sketched a theory
of evidence that predicts the blindspot thesis: while negative access can fail,
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agents always have to believe that it is true of them. I showed that a schematic
reliabilist-contextualist account of evidence naturally makes such a prediction,
and explained how it offers an attractive akrasia-free treatment of the red wall,
my toy counterexample to negative access. Of course, there is much that’s con-
troversial about that account, and about the argument that it predicts negative
access failures to be ‘elusive’ in the way described, and I have not been able to
defend every detail. But I think that the proposed implementation passes the
threshold of plausibility required to show that my general strategy is viable.
If I am right that externalism and the rejection of akrasia can be reconciled
in this way, then that is a significant result. One immediate consequence is that
it strengthens the case for externalism, by showing how externalism can avoid
some of the counter-intuitive consequences it is naturally taken to entail. In
this way, my application of contextualism is quite similar to the more familiar
application of contextualism to the sceptical puzzle. In both cases, the contextu-
alist sides with the theorist who maintains that (in ordinary contexts) we have
plenty of knowledge or evidence; but she does so whilst respecting the intuitions
moving us towards scepticism, or internalism, in the first place.
Potentially even more important, however, are the consequences for debates
amongst externalists. As I mentioned in §2, the denial of negative access is not
the only potential tension between externalism and an anti-akrasia norm. If
there is no hope for externalists to preserve anti-akratic intuitions, there is little
point in exploring conciliatory resolutions to those other tensions. Once the
non-negotiable denial of negative access has been reconciled with the rejection
of akrasia, however, that project regains much of its interest and can serve as a
useful dialectical lever in resolving disputes amongst externalists.35
On a more impressionistic level, the view suggested here also promises to
offer a deeper insight into the internalism/externalism debate. It is easy to feel
that how one comes down in this dispute depends on how one approaches
35Another interesting project for externalists to examine is whether the response suggested
here can be extended to deal with problematic ‘diachronic’ consequences of denying negative
access, such as issues about diachronic reflection principles (see e.g. Williamson (2000) and
Salow (forthcoming)), or about the connection between accuracy and conditionalization (see
e.g. Bronfman (2014) and Schoenfield (forthcoming)). I suspect that it can, but I cannot defend
that suspicion here.
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epistemology.36 On the one hand, one can approach it from the first person
perspective, asking questions such as ‘what should I believe?’ – internalism
then seems almost inevitable. Alternatively, one can approach epistemology
third-personally, asking questions such as ‘what belief-forming mechanisms
should creatures like us living in a world like ours be employing?’ – externalism
then seems very natural. The Elusive Externalism defended here offers a new
way of vindicating this intuition. For the view predicts the access principle, and
thus internalism, to be ‘true from the first person perspective,’ since any rational
agent must believe that it holds of her. But the view also maintains that, when
we step back and examine epistemological principles more impersonally, we
can see that the access principle, and hence internalism, often fails. Showing
how exactly this insight can help us to make progress elsewhere in the debate
will, however, have to remain a project for future work.
36See, for example, many of the essays in Kornblith (2001).
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Appendix A Externalism and Radical Akrasia
In the case of the red wall, an agent’s evidence can support an akratic state.
However, that state isn’t radically akratic because the probability and expected
probability of ‘the wall is red’ come apart only by .09. This may make the problem
seem less serious. And it suggests that a different understanding of what it is for
a graded state to be akratic might not classify this state as akratic at all.
This line of thought is not, I think, very promising, because we can construct
structurally similar cases which do yield radical akrasia by any plausible account.
In particular, we can describe situations in which an agent’s evidence tells against
p to an arbitrarily high degree whilst also making it arbitrarily likely that it tells
in favour of p to an arbitrarily high degree. The state supported by such evidence
is clearly radically akratic on any remotely reasonable account of akrasia.
I will first describe the case abstractly, using the tools of epistemic logic.
We have a set W of possible worlds and an accessibility relation R between
worlds such that wRw ′ only if the evidence had by the relevant agent at w does
not entail that she is not in w ′. For simplicity, W will be finite and the prior
probability distributions uniform, so that the probability of p ⊆W at a world w
is just the proportion of worlds accessible from w which are also in p.
The abstract model goes as follows. For some finite n, W = {w, v1, v2, . . . , vn ,
u1,u2, . . .un2 } and R is such that xR y iff (i) x =w or (ii) y = v j for some j or (iii)
x = y . That is: w can access every world; the v j can access all and only each
other; and each ui can access itself and every v j . As a diagram:37
37Pictorial conventions: any two worlds in the same circle can access each other, and any world
that can ‘access’ a circle can access every world in that circle. To avoid clutter, I have omitted the
reflexive arrows indicating that each world can see itself.
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Now let p = {v1, v2, . . . , vn}. Then the probability of p at each ui is nn+1 , which will
approach 1 as n increases. Moreover, the probability at w that some ui or other is
actual is n
2
n2+n+1 which approaches 1 as n increases. Finally, the probability at w
of p is n
n2+n+1 , which approaches 0 as n increases. So for large n, the probability
at w of p is arbitrarily close to 0, while the probability at w that the probability
of p is extremely close to 1 is itself arbitrarily close to 1. This surely makes for
radical akrasia by any measure.
Note that R is transitive and reflexive, and the prior probability distribution
is the same at every world; the radical akrasia is thus entirely due to failures
of symmetry and thus, ultimately, to failures of the negative access principle.
Moreover, there is a (somewhat abstract) way to motivate the model which
relies on a similar epistemological picture to the one motivating the example
of the red wall.38 For imagine a creature with n2 independent mechanisms
for learning facts that are, in this case, independent; and let us suppose that a
mechanism yields knowledge if it is, in fact, delivering the truth, even if some
other mechanism is being fooled.39 Then w is the ultimate sceptical scenario,
in which all the mechanisms are led astray; each v j is a possibility in which
all mechanisms are reliable; and each ui is a possibility in which exactly one
of the mechanisms delivers a falsehood. This yields the desired accessibility
relations, since every working mechanism delivers information which rules out
the possibility in which that mechanism is malfunctioning.
38Note also that the model is ‘convergent’ as well as transitive and reflexive; it thus validates
S4.2, the strongest logic for knowledge advocated in the literature. So, given something like E=K,
it is hard to see what could prevent the existence of situations for which this is the correct model.
39We can make it part of the agent’s background knowledge that there won’t be any Gettier
cases; so that whenever a mechanism delivers the truth, it does so reliably.
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Appendix B Blindspots and Akrasia
I claim that a probabilistically coherent agent who (i) knows exactly what the
evidential support relation is, (ii) knows that her evidence obeys the positive
access principle and (iii) all-out believes that her evidence satisfies the negative
access principle will never be akratic. Since, as noted in §2, failures of (i) and (ii)
are independent sources of akrasia, this establishes my claim in footnote 30 that,
given the blindspot thesis, probabilistically coherent agents cannot be akratic
due to failures of the negative access principle.
To prove this rigorously and in general, we need some formalism. We will
look at models that are 4-tuples <W,P,RK ,RB >, where W is the (finite) space
of possibilities, P the evidential support relation, RK the accessibility relation
for the agent’s evidence, and RB the accessibility relation for what the agent
all-out believes. Since our agent knows exactly what the evidential support
relation is, it makes sense to model her prior credences as matching the a priori
evidential support P . And it’s also natural to assume that our agent’s credences
in a particular world are obtained by conditionalizing her priors on the set of
possibilities consistent with her all-out beliefs at that world. We can thus define
the agent’s credence at a world as Crw (p) =de f P (p|RB (w)). The evidential
support a proposition has at a world is clearly given by Prw (p)=de f P (p|RK (w)).
Since evidence is true, RK is reflexive. By positive access, RK is transitive.
By the blindspot thesis, we have that, for each w , RK is symmetric on RB (w).
Finally, since the agent knows that she satisfies the positive access principle,
we can assume that if our agent doesn’t believe that the she knows p, she also
won’t all-out believe p. Since RB is supposed to represent what the agent all-out
believes, this yields the constraint that RK (u)⊆RB (w) whenever u ∈RB (w). So
RK (u)=RK (u)∩RB (w) whenever u ∈RB (w).
Now, let w be an arbitrary world. Transitivity, reflexivity, and restricted
symmetry guarantee thatRK is an equivalence relation on RB (w), and hence
partitions RB (w). Call the cells of the partition c1, . . . ,cn . Note that, for any u ∈ ci ,
RK (u)∩RB (w)= ci .
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Then the law of total probability gives us that
P (p|RB (w))=
∑
1≤i≤n
P (ci |RB (w))P (p|RB (w)∩ ci )
= ∑
1≤i≤n
P (ci |RB (w))P (p|ci )
= ∑
u∈RB (w)
P ({u}|RB (w))P (p|RB (w)∩RK (u))
= ∑
u∈RB (w)
P ({u}|RB (w))P (p|RK (u))
= ∑
u∈RB (w)
P ({u}|RB (w))Pru(p)
= ∑
x∈[0,1]
P (Pr (p)= x|RB (w))x.
But, given our definition of Crw , that is just the anti-akrasia constraint that an
agent’s credence match her estimate of the evidential probability, i.e. that
Crw (p)=
∑
x∈[0,1]
Crw (Pr (p)= x)x.
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